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I. INTRODUCTION
O n July 17, 1984 the National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984
was signed into law by President Ronald Reagan.' The law calls for
the states to raise their minimum drinking age to a nationally uniform
age of twenty-one. Those states that do not comply by July 1986 face a
reduction in the highway funds allocated to them under the Federal
Highway Aid Act.2
The purpose of the law is to save the lives3 of Americans who travel our
highways, but it is specifically aimed at alleviating the disproportionate
number of fatal accidents among young people each year.4 There can be
no debate that this goal is legitimate, rational and based on an identified
1 Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Highway Safety Amendments. Pub.
L. No. 98-363, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 435 (codified as amended at
§ 158 Sec. 6(2), Ch. 1, 23 U.S.C. (1984)).
2 23 U.S.C. § 104 (1984).
3 H. R. REP. No. 606, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984).
4 Id.
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need.5 Essentially, it constitutes the federal interest which is given its
validity by the power granted Congress under the commerce clause. 6
This Note will examine the federal interest as it conflicts with the
states' interest in setting their own drinking ages, which are derived from
section two of the twenty-first amendment and the tenth amendment,
respectively.7 This conflict is given sharper focus when examined in the
context of Supreme Court tests and balancing measures developed in
recent decades in these constitutional arenas.
A controversy has arisen because of the congressional imposition of a
national minimum drinking age on the states through coercive withhold-
ing of federal funds. Many concerned persons question whether this
vehicle is constitutionally enpowered under the commerce clause. Simi-
larly, it is argued that the rights reserved to the states under the tenth
and twenty-first amendment should bar Congress' actions.
It is the purpose of this Note to examine the controversy created by the
Drinking Age Act. The presentation will begin with a background and
history of the drinking age legislation and a closer examination of the
promulgation of the law. This will be followed by a discussion of the
debate over the need for such a measure, examining factual studies,
public sentiment and the arguments pro and con. The focus will then shift
to an examination of the constitutional considerations of the Drinking
Age Act. Finally, the conclusion reached herein is that the Drinking Age
Act is constitutional and the body of this article is devoted to the
assertion of that proposition.
II. BACKGROUND
It is no secret that the youth of our nation are familiar with the use of
alcohol.8 The young person's familiarity with alcohol leads to an attitude
5 Id. at 2-4.
6 "The Congress shall have the power to... regulate Commerce with foreign Nations
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7 "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. "The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
' A national survey conducted for the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism (N.I.A.A.A.), early in 1974, indicated that 93% of boys and 87% of girls in their
senior year of high school, had experimented with alcohol. More than half of the nation's
seventh graders had tried drinking at least once during the previous year, Survey of
Adolescent Alcohol Drinking, Behavior, Attitudes, and Correlates. Report prepared for the
N.I.A.A.A. by Research Triangle Institute, Inc., 1974. ALCOHOL HEALTH AND RESEARCH WORLD,
Summer 1975, N.I.A.A.A..
At the end of 1983, the percentages have remained relatively constant, with 93% of all
high school seniors surveyed reporting they have used alcohol. The N.I.A.A.A. reports that
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that its regular use is socially acceptable. 9 This attitudinal change over
the past two decades, in conjunction with the increase in mobility of the
younger generation, has caused a dramatic increase in alcohol-related
traffic fatalities in the sixteen to twenty-four year old age group. 10
The increase was first noted in the wake of widespread state legislative
acts lowering the legal drinking age early in the decade of the seventies.1
As the state legislatures were expanding the baby boom generation's civil
rights, a concerted effort was undertaken by the federal government to
reduce the problems associated with teenage use of alcoholic beverages.
The federal initiative culminated in the passage of the Comprehensive
approximately 41% of the 1982 high school sample reported occasional heavy drinking (five
or more drinks on one occasion during a two week period prior to the survey). FIRH SPECIAL
REPORT To THE U.S. CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH 2 at 4, (U.S. Dept. of Health and
Human Services)(Dec. 1983).
9 31% of the 1981 high school seniors surveyed did not disapprove of taking one or two
drinks nearly every day. Fi-rH SPECIAL REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH
at 5.
10 While the sixteen to twenty-four age group comprises only 16.5% of the U.S.
population, it accounts for 44.6% of all alcohol-related accidents. Malin, Alcohol Related
Highway Fatalities Among Young Drivers-United States, 31 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 642 (1982) Nuskaumer, Autos, Alcohol and Adolescence: Forgotten Concerns and
Overlooked Linkages, 11 J. DRUG. EDUC. 2 (1981).
11 When the twenty-seventh amendment to the Constitution was ratified in 1971, giving
18, 19 and 20 year olds the right to vote in national elections, many states lowered their
minimum legal drinking ages. The belief by many legislators was that if young people were
old enough to vote, marry and serve in the armed forces, they were old enough to drink
responsibly. As a result, between September 1970 and September 1973, twenty-four states
lowered their drinking ages from 21 to 20, 19 or 18. ALCOHOL & HEALTH NoTEs, (U.S. Dept.
of Health, Educ. and Welfare) (Oct. 1973).
As of 1977 the following changes were made in several states:
Changes In Alcohol-Purchasing Age by State
From 21 to 18 From 21 to 19
Connecticut (1972) Alabama (1975)
Florida (1973) Arizona (1972)
Georgia (1972) Idaho (1972)
Iowa (1972-73) Wyoming (1973)
Maryland (1975)
Massachusetts (1973) From 21 to 20
Michigan (1972) Delaware (1972)
Minnesota (1973)
Montana (1971-73) From 20 to 18
New Hampshire (1973) Hawaii (1972)
New Jersey (1973) Maine (1972
Rhode Island (1972)
Tennessee (1971) From 20 to 19
Texas (1973) Alaska (1970)
Vermont (1971) Nebraska (1972)
West Virginia (1972)
Wisconsin (1972)
Smart, Goodstadt, Effects of Reducing the Legal Alcohol Purchasing Age on Drinking
and Drinking Problems: A Review of Empirical Studies, 38 J. STUD. ALCOHOL 1313, 1314
(1977).
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Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilita-
tion Act Amendments of 1974.12 That Act's purpose was to provide
community resources, through federal funding, to eradicate alcohol abuse
and its related problems The Act was intended to encourage prevention
and treatment of problem drinking and problem drinkers through
community-based programs designed to divert problem drinkers from the
criminal justice system. 13
The Prevention Act has been effective in creating a public awareness of
the enormous alcohol problem in our society and it has spawned a
proliferation of alcoholism treatment programs. However, the Act has
failed to address the problem of drunk driving with particularity.
In this decade, we have seen a decline in the programmatic approach to
our nation's problems such as drunk driving, and are experiencing a more
"militant" approach. 14 This is evidenced by the emergence of grassroot
political groups,' 5 which advocate the enactment of tough laws against
drunk drivers and have succeeded in convincing legislatures to pass
tougher laws. 16 Having experienced success at state and local levels these
organizations, led by Mothers Against Drunk Driving (M.A.D.D.), are
now focusing their energies on national issues.
Backed by studies proffering considerable evidence that increasing the
legal age for the possession, purchase, consumption or sale of alcoholic
beverage can be effective measure to reduce drunk driving accidents
among youth,' 7 a movement was underway by 1980 to require a national
12 Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse & Alcohol Prevention, Treatment & Rehab. Act,
Amendments of 1974 Pub. L. No. 93-282, 88 Stat. 125 (1974)(This law amended the 1970
Act (of same name) and the current version as amended through 1983 is codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 4541-94 (1983)).
13 42 U.S.C. § 4541 (1983).
14 See Starr, The War Against Drunk Drivers, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 13, 1982, at 34.
1" Mothers Against Drunk Driving (M.A.D.D.), Remove Intoxicated Drivers (R.I.D.),
Students' Against Drunk Driving (S.A.D.D.).
16 One commentator offers an excellent exemplary discussion of tougher new drunk
driving statutes. See Bitem, Under the Influence of California's New Drunk Driving Law: Is
the Presumption of Innocence on the Rocks?, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 91 (1982). A California
law makes it a crime to drive a motor vehicle when one's blood-alcohol level is. 10% or more,
curtails the ability to plea bargain in a DWI case and creates stiff new penalties for
conviction. See also Gifford and Friedman, A Constitutional Analysis of Ohio's New Drunk
Driving Law, 15 U. TOL. L. REv. 133, 136 n. 29 (1983)(cites numerous state statutes,
including Ohio's, that make driving with a .10% blood-alcohol concentration a violation).
"7 Douglas, The Effect of Lower Legal Drinking Ages on Youth Crash Involvement. FINAL
REPORT No. UM-HSRI-A1-74-1-2 Wash. D.C.: National Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
June 1974; Hingson, Impact of Legislation Raising the Legal Drinking Age in Massachusetts
from 18-20, 73 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 163 (1983); Maxwell, Impact and Analysis of the Raised
Legal Drinking Age in Illinois, Washington D.C.: National Highway Traffic Safety Admin.
(Dec. 1981); Wagenar, Raising the Legal Drinking Age in Michigan & Maine, REPORT No.
UM-HSRI-81-58. Rockville, Md. Nat. Inst. of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (1981); NAT.
TRANSP. SAFETY BD. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS, H-82-18 (July 23, 1982); Klein, The Effect of
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minimum drinking age of twenty-one. By rallying support from local
community groups, sufficient national attention was mustered to demand
congressional action. Congress first addressed the need for a minimum
national drinking age of twenty-one in 1982.18 Early in 1982 President
Reagan established the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving
which recommended that a national minimum drinking age be enacted
throughout the United States. 19 In September of 1983, with the consent
of the Administration 20 and widespread support in Congress, legislation
was introduced in the House of Representatives calling for the National
Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984.21
The bill quickly made its way through congressional channels and was
signed into law by President Reagan on July 17, 1984 as part of the
Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1984.22
Section 141 of the Act amended Title 23 of the United States Code by
Raising the Minimum Legal Drinking Age on Traffic Accidents in Maine, N.H.T.S.A.
TECHNICAL REpr. (Dec. 1981).
15 Congress first addressed the need for a National Minimum Drinking Age in 1982 by
"encoura[ging] each state to prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages to persons who are less
than 21 years of age." Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424,
§ 209, 1982 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (96 Stat) 2140. The first reported lobbying effort was
by Ms. Candy Lightener of M.A.D.D. who received the support of House Majority Leader
Jim Wright (D-Tx.) in July 1983. M.A.D.D. NATIONAL NEWSLETrER, Fall, 1984 at 8.
15 The Commission recommended that states "should immediately adopt twenty-one as
the minimum legal purchasing and public possession age for all alcoholic beverages; [and
that] "such legislation should provide that the Secretary of the United States Dept. of
Transp. disapprove any project under Section 106 of the Federal Aid Highway Act (Title 23
U.S.C.) for any state not having and enforcing such a law. PRESIDENTIAL COMM. ON DRUNK
DRIVING, FINAL RPr. at 10. (John Volpe, Chmn.)(Nov. 1983).
20 "Drunk driving is a national menace, a national tragedy and a national disgrace. It
is my fervent hope that this report will receive the attention it deserves, and that it will
speed the adoption of whatever measures are appropriate to remove this hazard from our
national life." PRESIDENTIAL COMM. ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL Rpr. at i. (John Volpe, Chmn.)
(Nov. 1983). (An excerpt from a letter to the American people by President Reagan.)
2' H.R. 3870 was introduced by James Florio (D-N.J.) calling for restriction of sales of
alcoholic beverages in interstate commerce. H.R. 3870,98th Cong. 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC.
H-6815 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1983).
22 The following is the legislative history of the Drinking Age Act. See Id. for the House
of Representatives' first proposal. The Senate's first proposal was S.2719 by Mr. Lautenberg
on May 29, 1984, calling for an amendment to Section 6(2), Chapter 1 of Title 23, U.S.C., §
2719 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S-6456 (daily ed., May 24, 1984).
On June 26, 1984, Mr. Lautenberg submitted amendment no. 3334 to the Senate
proposing to amend the Surface Transp. Assistance Act of 1982, (H.R. 4616), which
amendment contained the original provisions of S. 2719 amend, no. 3334, 98th Cong. 2d
Sess. 130 CONG. REC. S-8256-57 (daily ed., June 26, 1984).
The next day the House of Representatives concurred on the amendment to the Act. H.R.
4616, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H.-7220 (daily ed. June 27, 1984).
From there the bill went to President Reagan who signed it into law as Pub. L. No.
98-363. See Pub. L. No. 98-363, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 434 (codified
as amended at § 6 (a), Ch. 1, 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1984)).
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adding Section 158 titled "National Minimum Drinking Age", which
provides that the Secretary of the United States Transportation Depart-
ment shall withhold five per cent of the amount required to be appor-
tioned to any state under each of sections 104(b)(1), 104(b)(2), 104(b)(5),
and 104(b)(6) of Title 23 U.S.C. (Federal Highway Aid Act). The funds are
to be withheld on the first day of the fiscal year succeeding the first fiscal
year beginning after September 30, 1985, in which it is lawful for a
person who is less than twenty-one years of age, to purchase alcoholic
beverages or to possess such in public. The percentage of federal highway
funds that shall be withheld pursuant to Title 23, U.S.C. Section 158
doubles the following fiscal year for any state that continues to permit the
purchase of public possession of any alcoholic beverage by a person under
the age of twenty-one. 23
III. THE DEBATE: Is THERE A NEED FOR A NATIONAL
MINIMUM DRINKING AGE?
The House Committee on Energy and Commerce drafted the Drinking
Age Act in response to the recognition that having differing state
minimum drinking ages created an "interstate problem".24 This lack of
uniformity among state laws provides teenagers with an incentive to
drink and drive as they cross state borders in search of a lower drinking
age. 25 The result of having approximately one-half of the states without
a twenty-one minimum is a "crazy quilt of different States' drinking laws
and far too many blood borders where teens drive across to reach states
with lower drinking ages." 26
Empirical studies have been conducted which substantiate the "crazy
quilt" theory.27 Generally, the current data shows that raising the legal
23 Pub. L. No. 98-363, 1984 U.S. CONG. & An. NEws (98 Stat.) 437.
24 See supra note 3.
25 PRESIDENTIAL COMM. ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL Rer. at 11. (John Volpe, Chmn.)(Nov.
1983).
26 President's statement to the public, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1035 (July 23, 1984).
27 Cook, The Effect of Minimum Drinking Age Legislation on Youthful Auto Fatalities,
1970-1977, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 169 (1984). (Study reports that the cumulative effect of
minimum drinking age laws during the early 1970's was to cause a substantial increase in
18 to 20 year old automobile fatality rates, averaging about 150 lives per year during the
mid-1970's.); Williams, The Effect of Raising the Legal Minimum Drinking Age on
Involvement in Fatal Crashes, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 169 (1983). (Reports a substantial decrease
in fatalities among law-affected age groups when states raise their legal minimum drinking
age.); Williams, The Legal Minimum Drinking Age and Fatal Motor Vehicle Crashes, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 219 (1975)(Study that concentrated on border areas of eleven states indicated
a significant rise in fatalities in areas that changed their laws.); See also Smart, Effects of
Reducing the Legal Alcohol Purchasing Age on Drinking and Drinking Problems: A Review
of Emphirical Studies, 38 J. STUD ALCOHOL 1313 (1977); Hingson, Impact of Legislation
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drinking age can be expected to result in an average annual reduction of
twenty-eight percent of nighttime fatal automobile crashes involving
eighteen to twenty year old drivers.28 The conclusion of the authors of the
studies indicates that raising minimum legal drinking ages will have
substantial societal benefits. 29
The target group of eighteen to twenty year olds has not been chosen
arbitrarily. It has been shown that this age group is involved in a
disproportionate number of fatal automobile crashes, which have been
caused in part, by the contemporary proprensity of teenagers to drink
more often and to consume more alcohol during social events. 30 While
most informed legislators and politicians would agree that there has been
a serious increase in the problems associated with youths drinking and
driving, not all agree on how to address the problems.
As evidenced by the Congress' expedient passage of the Drinking Age
Act, the majority opinion is that a national approach is the solution.
There also is a showing that a large majority of the general public is in
favor of a national minimum drinking age of twenty-one.3 ' The most
recent report finds that as of June 1, 1985, twenty-four states will have a
strictly twenty-one age limit and at least eighteen other states are
considering similar laws.3 2 Recently, a group of northeastern governors
convened in an effort to ensure that a uniform minimum drinking age is
enacted in their region.33
Generally the proponents of the Drinking Age Act cite the social
benefits of reducing traffic fatalities and protecting the entire public's
safety on the highway as the primary reason for the law. 34 The argument
that federal intervention is needed is supported by the belief that state
legislatures will be slow to act because of special interest group compe-
Raising the Legal Drinking Age in Massachusetts from 18 to 20, 73 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 163
(1983).
28 See PRESIDENTIAL COMM. ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL Rpr. at 10.
29 See authorities cited, supra note 27.
" See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
3' The Gallup Poll, released Thurs., Jan. 27, 1983, found that 79% of those persons
surveyed favored passage of a 21 drinking age law. Even the 18 to 20 year old age group
gave 58% majority approval. Reprinted in N.Y. Times, July 8, 1984, § 1 at 22, col. 3.
32 Those states in the strictly twenty-one category are: Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Calif., Del.,
Ill., Ind., Ky., Md., Mich., Mo., Neb., Nev., N.J., N.M., N.D., Okla., Ore., Pa., R.I., Utah,
Wash. Those states with proposed bills to raise the limits to twenty-one are: Ala., Colo.,
Conn., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Kan., Minn., Miss., Mont., N.H., N.Y., S.C., Tex., Vt., Va., W. Va.,
and Wyo. USA Today Jan. 25, 1985, § 1, at 8 and 10. See also N.Y. Times May 31, 1984, §
2, at 7, Col. 1.
" Bazemore, Efforts to Increase Drinking Age Bolstered, 15 CRIM. JUSTICE NEWSLETTER 5
(Jan. 3, 1984).
14 Florio, A National Legal Drinking Age of Twenty-One? Raise it to Twenty-One and
End the Carnage, 70 A.B.A. J. 18 (Apr. 1984).
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tition. This will result in an indefinite postponement of a solution to the
problems of "teenage highway carnage. '35
Because of the disproportionate number of fatalities along the borders
of states with differing age limits, the sponsors of the law argue that
"teenage highway carnage is an interstate commerce concern properly
regulated by the federal legislature." 36 Backed by a legal opinion that
even local and intrastate commerce in alcoholic beverages can be regu-
lated by Congress, the proponents of the Act assert that it is constitu-
tional. This opinion has been borne out by recent Supreme Court
decisions.3 7
The opponents of the Act raise the issue that, in its current form, the
Act treads on the sacred ground of state sovereignty. The argument in
favor of the states regulating the drinking age is that, in a culturally
diverse democracy, state action is a more effective method of controlling
social behavior.38 Also, the opponents urge that a history lesson proves a
new prohibition on drinking will be no more successful in preventing
problems associated with alcohol than were the original Prohibition laws.
They also argue that arbitrarily denying any age group the right to
consume alcohol, punishing those who do not have problems with
drinking, is tantamount to age discrimination and inherently unfair.3 9
The main contention of state officals' is their opposition to what is known
as the mailed-fist approach used by Congress. The objection of these
opponents is that enlargement of the federal role in alcoholic beverage
legislation is ineffective and misguided. 40 Finally, those persons in the
affected age group oppose the legislation on the grounds that they are
being singled out for a problem which affects all age groups. 41 These
opponents argue that better education and stricter enforcement of traffic
violations would accomplish the goals of the twenty-one drinking age
limitation much more effectively than the National Minimum Drinking
Age law. They also cite stronger enforcement at the point of sale and
higher scrutiny in licensing drivers as furthering the same goals.4 2
Past legislation using federal highway funds to coerce states into
adopting the fifty-five mile-per-hour speed limit has resisted constitu-
tional challenges. Speed limit legislation is analogous to the matter at
issue in the Drinking Age Act and will serve as precedent for the new
law. In response, at least one critic has stated that although "there is no
" Bazemore, Raising the Drinking Age, 14 CRIM. JUSTICE NEWSLETTER 24, at 1-2 (Dec. 5,
1983).
36 H.R. REP. No. 606, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, at 2, 4 and 5.
17 Id. at 5-7. See also Florio, 70 A.B.A. J. 18 at 23-24.
38 Coleman, The Right Motive but the Wrong Solution, 70 A.B.A. J. 18 (Apr. 1984).
39 See Bazemore, supra note 33, at 2.
40 N.Y. Times, June 27, 1984, § 1, at 24, col. 2.
41 N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1984, § 23, at 4, col. 3.
42 Id. See also Bazemore, supra note 33, at 2.
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right to drive fast," a case can be made out under the twenty-first
amendment that the right to drink is not within the purview of the
federal government to prohibit.43 In fact, there are lawsuits pending in
Ohio and South Dakota, which challenge the Drinking Age Act on
constitutional grounds. 44 These suits raise tenth and twenty-first amend-
ment objections to the Drinking Age Act. Hence, these two amendments
to the Constitution set the parameters for the constitutional debate.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
The most apparent vulnerability of the Drinking Age Act is whether it
will withstand a constitutional challenge based on states' rights under
the tenth and twenty-first amendments. These rights will likely be
invoked by a state, in its own right, or by an associational plaintiff who
can pass the Constitution's article three "case or controversy" require-
ments of standing in federal court. Generally, an associational plaintiff
must show "injury-in-fact," that there is a "logical nexus" between its
statutes under the challenged law and the controversy it presents and
that its interests are within the "zone of interests" affected by the law.4 5
There are other putative arguments that individual plaintiffs may assert,
such as age discrimination or denial of substantive due process, but these
challenges seem more tenuous than those founded on states' rights.46 If a
plaintiff expects to present a justiciable challenge to the Drinking Age
Act, that plaintiff will have to focus on the issues raised when the
commerce power of Congress clashes with the tenth and twenty-first
amendments.
The lines of analysis used in tenth and twenty-first amendment
adjudication bear similarities but have rarely converged in the same
" See Coleman, supra note 38, at 24. (Ex-Secretary of Transp. Coleman argues that
the twenty-first amendment serves as a constitutional obstacle to the Drinking Age Act.)
44 Ohio Retail Permit Holders v. Dole, C No. 284-1541 (S.D. Ohio filed Aug. 23, 1984);
and State of South Dakota v. Dole, No. Civ. 84-5137 (D.S.D. filed Sept. 21, 1984).
" See generally Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Barlow v. Collins, 379 U.S. 159
(1970); Assoc. of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Trafficante v. Metro Life Ins. Comp. 409 U.S. 205 (1972); and
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
46 The two suits pending rely solely upon tenth and twenty-first amendment challenges
to the Drinking Age Act. South Dakota v. Dole, No. Civ 84-5137 (D.S.D. filed Sept. 21, 1984)
relies on the authority of the State Attorney General to bring suit, while Ohio Retail Permit
Holders v. Dole, C No. 284-1541 (D. Ohio filed Aug. 23, 1984) involves a suit by an
associational plaintiff who has joined a corporation, its president and a nineteen year old
resident of Ohio as individual plaintiffs. The complaint alleges the corporation, a saloon,
will be forced out of business because of the Drinking Age Act, and that the young man will
be deprived of "his right" he lawfully enjoys to purchase and possess liquor. There is no
other mention of individual rights being violated and the heart of the complaint relies on
the tenth and twenty-first amendment rights afforded to the states.
1986]
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case. A state's challenge will be the same whether it invokes either
amendment as a basis for the Act's unconstitutionality. The analysis used
by the Supreme Court will be distinct and separate when it considers
each amendment. Therefore, these two areas of Supreme Court analysis
warrant separate discussion herein.
V. TENTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
A. Commerce Clause v. Tenth Amendment
Throughout American history, the Supreme Court has made several
attempts to explain the tension between Congress' power to regulate
commerce and the states' right to sovereignty. Beginning with a bold
statement in Gibbons v. Ogden47 in 1824 that the Congressional com-
merce power has broad applications, 48 the Court has given us a palinode
of decisions reflecting historical political considerations. 49 The Court's
analysis of the commerce clause, from 1937 through 1976, is more
pertinent to the issue at hand because it has created legal principles 5o
47 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
" Chief Justice Marshall first described the congressional power to regulate commerce
as such, "This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent; and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed
in the constitution." Id. at 196.
" After Gibbons, but before the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (1824-1887),
the Supreme Court's decisions were inconsistent. Some cases lined up with Gibbons and
offered the view that the limitations on congressional commerce power were political rather
than constitutional. In other cases, the Court took early steps towards the theory of dual
sovereignty which would later limit the power granted to Congress by the commerce clause.
See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 504, n. 6 (1978).
From 1887 to 1937 the Court consistently placed limitations on the congressional power
over commerce. Perhaps most of these decisions reflected the political need to allow industry
to grow during this period of great industrial growth in the United States. To justify its
decisions the Court created a formalistic classification doctrine to judge which activities
were subject to regulation under the commerce clause. See e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936)(holding as unconstitutional the bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935 because it regulated "production" and not "trade". United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,
156 U.S. 1 (1895)(the Court distinguished between "commerce" and "manufacture".)
In NLRB v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Court abandoned its
formalistic approach and developed the beginnings of the "substantial economic effect"
doctrine, determining that, "[A]lthough activities may be intrastate in character when
separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relationship to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from
burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control." Id.
at 37.
" The "substantial economic effect" doctrine is the first of these doctrines articulated by
the Court. It was applied to a very colloquial activity of a wheat farmer consuming his own
grain. The Court upheld federal wheat marketing quotas noting that, "[elven if [an] activity
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that remain salient today, especially in light of the court's decision to
overrule National League of Cities v. Usury,51 a landmark case of its time,
which gave great deference to state sovereignty.
One such principle is known as the "protective principle."52 It is a form
of federal commerce regulation that imposes protective conditions on the
privilege of engaging in an activity that affects interstate commerce or
utilizes the channels or instrumentalities of such commerce. The Court
has had no difficulty upholding federal legislation that utilizes protective
conditions to address activities that are not strictly within the realm of
the regulation of commerce. 53 Most often the protective principle applies
be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature,
be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce,
and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been
defined as 'direct' or 'indirect'." Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
The substantial economic effect test seems to be more refined and subject to broader
application in "the area of the National interest" under the "determinative test" of the
congressional commerce clause power stated in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964). "In short, the determinative test of the exercise of power by the Congress
under the Commerce Clause is simply whether the activity sought to be regulated is
Icommerce which concerns more States than one' and has a real and substantial relation to
the national interest." Id. at 255.
The Court formulated the "cumulative effect" principle in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942). The principle examines the aggregate economic effects of acts, which taken
alone are insignificant and trivial, but which are part of a class of acts whose cumulative
effect can reasonably be deemed to have substantial national consequences. The Court held
that Congress could control a farmer's home consumption of wheat because the cumulative
affect of many farmer's consumption would affect the supply and demand relationship in the
interstate wheat market.
The "cumulative effect" test was used by the Court in upholding federal legislation such
as; the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 891 et. seq. (1964) in Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a - 2000a-6 in
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964). In these decisions, the Court continually speaks of a "class of activities" that
congressional fact-findings have found to involve a social evil. See, e.g., Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. at 154-55.
The "protective principle" is a tool of the Court used to recognize and permit the use of the
commerce clause by Congress to achieve regulation in areas of social or business life that
are not strictly commercial. The Court used this principle in upholding the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 which provided for minimum wages and maximum hours for
employees. The Court states the rudiments of the principle as:
Congress, following its own conception of public policy concerning the restric-
tions which may appropriately be imposed on interstate commerce, is free to
exclude from the commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are
destined it may conceive to be injurious to be public health, morals or welfare,
even though the state has not sought to regulate their use.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941).
5' 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
52 See supra note 50.
53 Id.
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to regulation of activities that may be construed as racist,54 or "injurious
to the public health, morals or welfare." 5 It has been generally stated
that Congress may impose whatever conditions it sees fit, so long as the
conditions themselves violate no independent constitutional prohibi-
tion.5 6
The protective principle read in conjunction with the substantial
impact doctrine5 7 creates a judicial framework which can accommodate
the argument that the sale, possession and consumption of alcoholic
beverages has a great effect on interstate commerce, 58 whether it be
local59 or truly interstate. The imposition, by Congress, of the Drinking
Age Act on the states with conditional withholding of highway funding,
is within the congressional power to protect the public welfare. The
magnitude of the hazard of drunk driving on our nation's highways may,
alone, be considered an umbrella rationale that will justify any subordi-
nate measures taken to ensure that the problem is eliminated.
Assuming that the alcoholic beverage industry has had a substantial
economic impact on interstate commerce, the congressional regulation
affecting the industry should fall in place with the unbroken string of
precedents, in the forty years following the decision in NLRB v. Jones &
McLaughin,60 that granted Congress great latitude to legislate for the
public good in deference to states' rights. With the overruling of Usery,
Congress' authority to enact the Drinking Age Act has been bolstered.
Consequently, the Drinking Age Act must be examined in light of
contemporary tenth amendment analysis.6 Traditionally, the Supreme
5' Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
" Darby, 312 U.S. at 114.
56 Id.
57 See supra note 50.
58 California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980);
Hostettler v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
" Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
60 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
"' The contemporary analysis of the tenth amendment began with National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). That landmark case articulated the doctrine of "state
sovereignty" and was the only case to affirmatively strike down a federal legislative act
(Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982)) as unconstitutional. The
case seemed to herald a new age of federalism and serve as a limitation on the commerce
power of congress, but the decision brought on an avalanche of commentary debating
federalism and the tenth amendment. See, e.g., Barber, National League of Cities: New
Meaning for the Tenth Amendment?, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 161 (1976) (the case articulates no
coherent conception of state sovereignty); Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles:
Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165
(1977) (the case recognizes an individual right to "essential governmental services"); Tribe,
Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to
Essential Governmental Services, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1977)(same as above).
The Court then narrowed the doctrine of state sovereignty in subsequent decisions,
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Court has taken differing approaches in this analysis depending on
whether the sale of alcohol in a given state is a private commercial
function, or a function of the state government.
B. Sale of Alcohol as a Private Function
When the sale of alcohol in a state is a private function, it is highly
unlikely that any attack on the constitutionality of the Drinking Age Act
will be successful. The Supreme Court affirmatively stated in Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, that "[a] wealth of
precedent attests to congressional authority to displace or pre-empt state
laws regulating private activity affecting interstate commerce when
these law conflict with federal law. '6 2
The case law that is exemplified by this quote from Hodel indicates that
it would be futile to attempt an attack on the Drinking Age Act in a state
that allows the purveyance of alcohol as a private function.63
C. Sale of Alcohol as a State Government Function
When the sale of alcohol is primarily a function of the state govern-
ment, by and through its agents, analysis of its constitutionality is not as
cut and dry as it is under private function law. In the past decade there
has been a strong sentiment that "there are attributes of state sover-
eignty attaching to every state government which may not be impaired
upholding numerous federal regulations. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982),
(Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act does not violate tenth amendment); United Transp.
Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982), (Railway Labor Act does not violate tenth
amendment); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981)(Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act does not violate tenth amendment).
Consequently, the Usery doctrine suffered a major setback in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S.
226 (1983). The Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not violate
the tenth amendment. The Act is very similar to the Fair Labor Act invalidated in Usery.
The Court did not overrule Usery but placed a greater emphasis on a "balancing approach"
to tenth amendment analysis. In EEOC, the Court gives greater significance to the one
paragraph concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun in Usery, in which he states, "[ilt seems
to me that it [the Court] adopts a balancing approach" Usery, 426 U.S. at 856. See, e.g., Note,
National League of Cities v. Usery to EEOC v. Wyoming: Evolution of a Balancing Approach
to Tenth Amendment Analysis, 1984 DUKE L. J. 601 (1984).
Finally, the doctrine of state sovereignty as it was articulated in Usery has been replaced
by the tenent that states' rights are protected by "the solicitude of the national political
process [which provides] for the continued vitality of the States." Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The ruling in Garcia hails a new era in
Federalism and returns our national political process to pre-Usery doctrine. See supra notes
47-59 and accompanying text.
62 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 290.
63 See United States v. Walsh, 331 U.S. 432 (1947); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
at 113-14 (1941); Anthanasaw v. United States, 227 U.S. 326 (1912); Hoke v. United States,
227 U.S. 308, 322-23 (1913).
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by Congress."64 Consequently, one must still consider the vestiges of state
sovereignty that remain in the wake of Garcia v. San Antonia Metro.
Transit Authority,65 which expressly overruled Usery v. National League
of Cities. In the Garcia66 opinion, the Court posits that, "[I]f there are to
be limits on the Federal Government's power to interfere with state
functions--as undoubtedly there are-we must look elsewhere to find
them.67
Prior to Garcia it was necessary to go through a cumbersome four-
tiered analysis to determine when force of state immunity from federal
regulation would apply. Application of the rule of state immunity
depended on judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental
function could be classified as an integral or traditional function in the
particular state. This appraisal came from the principles enunciated in
Usery.68 However, Garcia expressly rejects the use of the traditional
governmental function rule "as unsound in principle and unworkable in
practice"69 because the "rule leads to inconsistent results at the same
time that it disserves principles of democratic self-governance."7o
The infirmities of the Usery doctrine did not go unnoticed by academia.
Many critics assailed the Usery tests as ambiguous and confusing.7 '
" Usery, 426 U.S. at 845.
r5 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
66 The Garcia opinion has "once again settled" the debate concerning Federalism. The
Court has changed directions in this note case and severely limited state immunity from
federal regulations. The doctrine of state sovereignty, which protected traditional or
integral functions of state governmental has gone by the wayside. Specifically, the Court
held that San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SFMTA) was not immune from
minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). (The
same law at issue in Usery.) The Court determined that the attempt to judicially appraise
the nature of traditional governmental functions was unworkable and inconsistent with
established principles of federalism. In essence the commerce power was given back the
clout that was temporarily diminished by the Usery rhetoric. The integrity of the political
interplay between Congress and State has been renewed as the primary guarantee against
the overextension of the commerce power.
67 469 U.S. at 547, emphasis added.
8 Usery established three tests, each of which had to be met before federal legislation
would be invalidated. They were: (1) the federal statute must regulate the States as States;
(2) the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably attributes of state
sovereignty; (3) it must be apparent that the States' compliance with the federal law would
directly impair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions. The fourth test was a balancing test that was added in subsequent
decisions and was applied even if the three preceding requirements were not all met,
provided the federal interest was so great as to justify state submission.
69 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
70 Id. at 547.
71 See Note, National League of Cities v. Usery to EEOC v. Wyoming: Evolution of a
Balancing Approach to Tenth Amendment Analysis, 1984 DUKE L. J. 601, 604 (1984); See
also Kiberg, Fort, National League of Cities v. Usery: Its Meaning and Impact, 45 Gao. WASH.
L. REv. 613, 615 n.23 (1977); La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux:
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Therefore, it is clear that any challenge against the Drinking Age Act's
constitutionality, based on the doctrine that traditional state governmen-
tal functions are immune from federal regulation, is for naught in the
post-Garcia view of Federalism. 72
Any viable attack on the constitutionality of Congress' power to enact
the Drinking Age Act will be primarily based on a twenty-first amend-
ment premise. However, the tenth amendment's reservation of sovereign
powers is not obliterated by the Garcia decision. "The States unquestion-
ably do 'retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign authority.' '73 A well
reasoned challenge of the Act will encompass those aspects of state
sovereignty that can be gleaned from reading the tenth and twenty-first
amendments in tandem. After all, these amendments are still integral
parts of the Constitution which has given meaning to all the freedoms
and choices we hold dear in this democracy. The Court asserts that, "the
text of the Constitution provides the beginning rather than the final
answer to every inquiry into question of federalism.
Because the twenty-first amendment seemingly grants the states
power over the control of liquor within its borders; an opponent of the
Drinking Age Act may use the tenth amendment's grant of "those
powers . . . reserved to the states," 4 as persuasive authority while
arguing the merits of the twenty-first amendment's grant of authority to
the states. That amendment gives an individual state the power to
regulate alcohol as it deems appropriate. Therefore, the tenth amend-
ment may still play a role in the opposition to the Drinking Age Act, but
in light of Garcia it will merely be a perfunctory one.
The Garcia Court makes it very clear that the federal judiciary should
not be given the authority to determine which state policies are legiti-
mate and which are not.75 This policy has the overture of a death knell for
any challenge to the Drinking Age Act in federal court. The language
that the majority uses in Garcia specifically refutes the Usery traditional
governmental functions doctrine. However, the precedent of Usery should
Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U.L. Q. 779,
808-09 (1982); Lopach, The New Federalism of the Supreme Court: Diminished Expectations
of National League of Cities, 43 MONT. L. REv. 181, 185 (1982); Matsumoto, National League
of Cities - From Footnote to Holding - State Immunity from Commerce Clause Regulation,
1977 ARIz. ST. L. R. 35, 73 (1977).
72 The two lawsuits filed shortly after the passage of the Drinking Age Act based their
constitutional challenges on the Usery doctrine of state sovereignty. E.g., State of South
Dakota v. Dole, No. CIV 89-5137 (D.S.D. filed Sept. 21, 1984); Ohio Retail Permit Hodlers
v. Dole, C. No. 284-1541 (D. Ohio filed Aug. 23, 1984).
73 469 U.S. at 549. (Quoting from EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 269).
74 U.S. CONST. amend. x.
75 "Any rule of state immunity that looks to the 'traditional' ... nature of governmental
functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which
state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes." 469 U.S. at 546.
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not be disregarded in any challenge, because the dissent in Garcia is
strong, and Justice Rehnquist states in his short soliloquy that he is
confident the Usery approach will in time commend the majority of the
Supreme Court.76
To counter the dissent, the majority in Garcia emphasizes that state
sovereign interests are more effectively protected by the very structure of
the federal system than by judicially created limits on the federal power.
The majority sums up its opinion in Garcia by asserting that, "[t]he
political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not
be promulgated. ' 77 In essence, the internal safeguards built into our
federal system with its separation of powers, and checks and balances, is
all that is necessary to ensure states' rights. The majority goes on to say
that the bench in Usery underestimated the solicitude of the national
political process and in doing so, "the Court tried to repair what did not
need repair."7
Because the Drinking Age Act was proposed and passed by locally
elected representatives of Congress, the state's will has been done. Any
individual state that desires to challenge the viability of the newly
reaffirmed federal system will have to wait until the composition of the
Court changes in such a way as to support Justice Rehnquist's prediction.
VI. TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
A. Generally
The most difficult issue concerning the constitutionality of the Na-
tional Minimum Drinking Age Act is contained in the twenty-first
amendment. Section one of the amendment repealed Prohibition; section
two provides that "[t]he transportation or importation into any State,
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohib-
ited." The controversy over the Act will center on whether the preserva-
tion of states' rights in the amendment will void the Congressional
enactment made under the commerce power.
Section two of the amendment has been the subject of considerable
academic and judicial interpretation. Historically, it has been interpreted
in two opposing manners.79 These views are known as the "absolutist"
76 Id. at 579.
77 Id. at 556.
71 Id. at 557.
7' Note, The Effect of the Twenty-First Amendment on State Authority to Control
Intoxicating Liquors, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1578, 1579-81 (1975); Note, Economic Localism in
State Alcoholic Beverage Laws'-Experience Under the Twenty-First Amendment, 72 HAiv.
L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1959).
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view, which states that section two of the twenty-first amendment gives
the states absolute power over the possession and sale of liquor within its
boundries; and the "federalist" view, which declares that section two
provides the states wishing to remain alcohol-free the power to do so, but
retains in Congress the power over interstate commerce in alcohol. The
"federalist" position seems to be the more readily accepted view in
modern times.80
B. National History of Alcohol Regulation
In the late nineteenth century, the alcoholic beverage industry had
reached national proportions which prompted the first federal attempts to
regulate the flow of alcohol among the states. The first enactment was the
Wilson Act in August of 18901 which provided that upon arrival in a
state, liquor would be subject to the laws of the state as if it were domestic
liquor. The manner in which the Supreme Court construed the Wilson
Act spawned a massive interstate traffic in mail order package liquor.82
In response to what it perceived as an abuse of the law in dry states,
Congress passed the Webb-Kenyon Act8 3 of 1913, making it a federal
offense to transport liquor into a state in contravention of its laws, and
further provided that the state law takes effect when the liquor reaches
its borders. The purpose of the Act was to protect dry states and give them
a higher degree of control over alcohol brought into the state. Commen-
tators on the history of the Webb-Kenyon Act have interpreted it as
belonging to the "federalist" tradition.8 4 It is generally considered to be
an impediment to congressional commerce power but not a grant of
plenary authority to the states' control over liquor.
80 Comment, State Power to Regulate Liquor: Section Two of the Twenty-First Amend-
ment, Reconsidered, 24 SYRAcuSE L. REV. 1131, 1151 (1973).
s' 26 Stat. 313 (1890)(codified at 27 U.S.C. § 121)(1984).
82 Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897)(the states could not forbid importation from
another state); Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898)(the state control did not take effect until
received by the consignee because "arrival" was construed to mean delivery to him rather
than arrival in the state).
83 37 Stat. 699 (1913), (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1984)) (passed March 1, 1913). "The
shipment or transportation . . . of any liquor ... from one state ... into another ... to be
received, possessed, sold or used ... in violation of any law of such state ... is prohibited."
The Webb-Kenyon Act was held constitutional in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland
R.R., 242 U.S. 311 (1917), on grounds that the plenary power of Congress over interstate
commerce justified its delegation of power to the states in this instance.
" Note, The Concept of State Power Under the Twenty-First Amendment, 40 TENN. L.
REV. 465, 468-73 (1973); Note, Constitutional Law - State Control of Alcoholic Beverages in
Interstate Commerce, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 127, 128 (1952); Note, The Twenty-First Amendment
v. The Interstate Commerce Clause, 55 YALE L. J. 815, 816-18 (1946), (gives Supreme Court
case history supporting this proposition); Comment, Constitutional Law: State Regulation of
Importation of Intoxicating Liquor Under the Twenty-First Amendment, 21 CORNELL L. REV.
504, 509-10 (1936).
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The regulation of problems developing in the interstate trafficking of
alcohol was rendered moot by the passage of the eighteenth amendment
in 1919.85 For the next fourteen years, the interstate commerce of
alcoholic beverages became illegal. It was under this cloud of regulation
and prohibition that the debates on the ratification of the twenty-first
amendment began in 1933.
The legislative history of the twenty-first amendment is ambiguous
86
because it is not quite clear under which theory (federalist or absolutist)
the amendment was passed. Senator Blaine, Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee in 1933, made statements supporting both theo-
ries.87 He ultimately stated to Congress that the intention of the drafters
was merely to incorporate the Webb-Kenyon Act into the Constitution.88
Thus, the passage of section two of the twenty-first amendment was "but
a restatement of the Webb-Kenyon law already on the law books, which
would write into the Constitution the right of the dry states to have
federal protection against the importation of liquor."' 9 While it is not
clear under which theory it was adopted, it is evident that a legislative
federalist intention can be read into the twenty-first amendment. Con-
sidering the contemporary movement of the Supreme Court towards a
federalist interpretation of the twenty-first amendment in its latest
decisions, no further inquiry into the legislative intent of its framers will
be made.
The Court has meted out the intent and purpose of the amendment over
the years and seems content to rest on what it has already presented. In
fact, the Court recently stated that it chooses to focus on the language of
section two of the twenty-first amendment rather than the legislative
history behind it.9
C. Early Supreme Court Position
The Supreme Court, in its early decision interpreting the amendment,
sided with the "absolutist" position upholding states' rights to exercise
considerable control over liquor. Its first major decision was State Bd. of
Equalization v. Young's Market Co.,91 which granted states plenary
85 "After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale of
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exporta-
tion thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for
beverage purposes is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XIVIII.
6 Note, Constitutional Law--State Control of Alcoholic Beverages in Interstate Com-
merce, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 127, 132 (1952).
87 76 CONG. REC. 64 (1933).
88 76 CONG. REC. 4141 (1933),
89 Statement of Sen. Bingham, 76 CONG. REc. 4228 (1933).
o California Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 US. 97, 106-07 (1980).
91 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
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power over importation of alcohol from other states. The court upheld a
California statute requiring a license fee for the privilege of importing
beer, a law the Court noted would not have been permissable before the
twenty-first amendment.
92
Justice Brandeis continued to afford the states even greater power in
the three subsequent opinions he authored on the subject. Mahoney u.
Joseph Triner Corp.9 3 gave the twenty-first amendment priority over the
fourteenth amendment in an equal protection clause challenge. The
petitioner's contention that state restrictions on the importation of
foreign liquor were discretionary toward him was squarely rejected by
Brandeis. In Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n9 4 and
Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick,95 the Court found that "[s]ince the
Twenty-first Amendment as held in the Young case, the right of a state
to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor [was] not
limited by the commerce clause." 96 The rationale of Young's Market was
sustained through these opinions and was solidified in Ziffrin v.
Reeves,97 which gave the states "absolute" authority over the control of
alcoholic beverages within their boundaries. Further, the Court gave the
states a blanket power to adopt measures "reasonably appropriate" to
exercise their police power over alcohol. 98 This type of thinking
dominated the Court's opinions, with few exceptions,9 over the next
twenty-five years.
92 Id. at 62.
93 304 U.S. 401 (1938).
94 305 U.S. 391 (1939).
95 305 U.S. 395 (1939).
96 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1939). Also Justice Brandeis reaffirmed that "[T]he substantive
power of the State to prevent the sale of intoxicating liquor is undoubted." Id.
97 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
98 Id. at 139.
" There are two areas of alcohol regulation in which the Court found no problem
limiting the states' power. They are: foreign importation and exportation and shipments to
and from federal enclaves. In William Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939)
(per curiam), the Court held that the states did not have exclusive power over alcohol
imported from abroad. The Court sidestepped the issue of federal power confronting the
twenty-first amendment. The opinion in Dept. of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co.,
377 U.S. 341 (1964) went along the same lines, holding that the states cannot levy an
importation tax on imported liquor because it contravened the export-import clause of the
Constitution.
The next major restriction to the states' plenary power over liquor came in Collins v.
Yosemite Park & Curry, Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938), where the Court rejected the State of
California's contention that the twenty-first amendment gave it the power to regulate and
tax liquor shipped into the Yosemite National Park. The Court reasoned that there was not
transportation into California "for delivery or use therein," and therefore, the State was
powerless to regulate the shipments. Id. at 538.
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The transition of the Court from an "absolutist" position to a "federal-
ist" position was a smooth one. As noted, 0 0 the absolutist position has
been chipped away and seems to have met its demise in the last two
decades. The twenty-first amendment has been used as a challenge to
major constitutional provisions, other than the commerce clause, and has
failed to prevail over them. This fact strengthens the argument that the
plenary power of the states is eroding' 0o
Under its current mode of analysis the Court has considered the
conflict of the twenty-first amendment with the federal commerce power
in two major cases, Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.
(1964)002 and California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Alumi-
num (1980).103 These two decisions are the key to determining the
constitutionality of the Drinking Age Act. Just as in tenth amendment
analysis, the Court has developed a balancing approach to weigh the
federal power under the commerce clause against the states' power
granted by the twenty-first amendment.
1o See supra note 99 and the cases discussed therein. See also Nippert v. Richmond, 327
U.S. 416, 425 n.15 (1946)(commerce clause vs. state taxing authority at issue). The Court
made a chip in the "absolutist" position when it included this footnote in its opinion:
Thus, even the commerce in intoxicating liquors, over which the Twenty-first
Amendment gives the states the highest degree of control, is not altogether
beyond the reach of the federal commerce power, at any rate when the state's
regulation squarely conflicts with regulation imposed by Congress ....
101 See Dept. of Revenue v. James B. Beam, 377 U.S. 341 (1964). Taking another chip at
the twenty-first amendment powers of the states the Court explained that:
To sustain the tax which Kentucky has imposed in this case would require
nothing short of squarely holding that the Twenty-first Amendment has com-
pletely repealed the Export-Import Clause so far as intoxicants are concerned.
Nothing in the language of the Amendment nor its history leads to such an
extraordinary conclusion.
377 U.S. at 345-46.
See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The Court reasons that neither the text nor
the history of the amendment suggests that it qualifies individual rights protected by the
fourteenth amendment. The Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that violated the
equal protection clause by discriminating between males and females in the sale of beer to
the 18-20 age group. In Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), the Court held
that a Wisconsin act, which allowed city officials to post lists of persons who drank
excessively so as to be a threat to the peace, violated the individual's procedural due process
rights. It recognized that such an action of "labeling" was too serious a matter to be
permitted without notice and a hearing. Most recently, the Court, in Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), struck down a Massachusetts statute allowing churches and
schools to veto liquor license applications by restaurants within a 500 foot radius of these
institutions, as violative of the establishment clause of the first amendment. The state could
not delegate power over liquor in a manner that infringes on the establishment clause.
102 377 U.S. 324 (1964)(Export-Import Clause).
'03 445 U.S. 97 (1980)(Anti-Trust Interest).
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D. The "Accommodation" Theory
The Court in Idlewildo4 made an affirmative ruling that the commerce
clause does act as a check on the broad powers granted to the states over
alcoholic beverage regulations. Justice Stewart recanted the Court's
early absolutist position that a state is totally unrestricted by the
commerce clause to control alcohol within its borders, and he cites the key
decisions that have elucidated this proposition.10 5 He then goes on to
qualify the precedential value of these opinions with the oft-quoted
passage:
To draw a conclusion from the line of decisions that the Twenty-
first Amendment somehow operated to 'repeal' the Commerce
Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned
would, however, be an absurd over simplification. If the Com-
merce Clause had been pro tanto 'repealed', then Congress would
be left with no regulatory power over interstate or foreign
commerce in intoxicating liquor. Such a conclusion would be
patently bizarre and is demonstrably incorrect.10 6
The next line in the opinion gives effect to the proposition that the
commerce clause does limit the twenty-first amendment. 10 7 Justice
Stewart then pronounces the "accommodation principle" as such: "Both
the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the
same Constitution. Like other provisions of the Constitution, each must
be considered in light of the other and in the context of the issues and
interests at stake in any concrete case."1os
Accommodation of the twenty-first amendment with the commerce
clause led the Idlewild Court to the conclusion that the states could not
104 Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964). The controversy
at issue was whether the respondent could sell bonded liquors it purchased from outside the
State of New York, and sell them to departing passengers on international flights out of
Kentucky Airport, with delivery taking place at point of destination, free from regulation
under the New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. The New York State Liquor Authority
informed Idlewild that its business was illegal and unlicensable under the Act. Respondent
brought suit seeking injunction against the Liquor Authority from interferring with its
business. The district court ruled that the commerce clause rendered New York's attempt to
terminate the business unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that because
the liquor "passed through the state" for use in a foreign country the commerce clause took
precedent over the twenty-first amendment and New York was not constitutionally able to
interfere.
105 Id. at 330-31.
'or Id. at 331-32.
107 Id. at 332 (citing Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939) and United
States v. Frankfort Distilleries 324 U.S. 293 (1945)). The Court rejected arguments that the
twenty-first amendment gives states complete and exclusive control over commerce of
intoxicating liquors unlimited by the commerce clause.
'o" idlewild, 377 U.S at 332.
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prevent transactions exercised under the protection of the laws passed by
Congress when that body exercises its commerce power to regulate
commerce with the foreign nations. In a later decision, the Court gave
the "accommodation principle" of Justice Stewart a more general
interpretation such that, "competing state and federal interests can be
reconciled only after careful scrutiny of those concerns in a 'concrete
case'." 10 9 These statements of principle are of great significance in
determining the constitutionality of the Drinking Age Act, because they
provide the judicial authority to balance the federal interests of highway
safety and preservation of life against the alleged sovereign rights of
states to sell alcoholic beverages and determine their own minimum
drinking age.
In Idlewild, the federal interest was the freedom of international trade
as facilitated by the Bureau of Customs. Opposing it was the state's
interest in assuring that the sales of liquor would be subject to public
scrutiny and governmental regulation.110 It seems that at the heart of all
liquor control statutes and regulations therein lies a public policy that
consumers must be protected, whether it be through laws regulating the
manufacture, distribution, sale, consumption or use of alcohol, or through
the enactment of tougher criminal sanctions for behavior arising from the
abuse of alcoholic beverages. This public policy is inherent in the
language of the twenty-first amendment because it was enacted to enable
dry states to remain dry. Hence, the "traditional" grant of authority to
the states to control and regulate alcoholic beverages within their borders
took effect.
Arguably, it is wise to leave the power to protect the people with the
unit of government best suited to provide the protection that the people
are entitled to receive under the law. However, by subjecting a "tradi-
tional" state interest based on this public policy to a balancing against
the federal commerce clause interest, the Court has made a momentous
shift in Idlewild as to how it decides controversies arising between the
commerce clause and twenty-first amendment powers.
By determining the federal interest in international trade (which
arguably affects a vastly smaller number of American citizens than those
affected by drunk driving) to be greater than state regulation of liquor,
the Court has, by association, opened the door to consideration of a wide
range of domestic interests. It also has shed new light on the relative
strength of the federal regulatory role in the alcoholic beverage industry.
This can be argued because the regulation of commerce among the
several states and foreign nations are concurrent powers of Congress,
included in the same clause of the Constitution. Where it can be shown
that deference to state sovereignty over the years, under the traditional
109 Mideal, 445 U.S. at 110.
110 377 U.S. at 325-32 nn. 1 and 2.
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public policy of the twenty-first amendment, has in fact contributed to the
creation of the special problem of teenage drunk drivers crossing state
borders in pursuit of otherwise unavailable alcohol, it is probable that the
Court will consider the Drinking Age Act as a plausible solution to the
problem. It will likely accommodate the Act in the same light as the
states' rights afforded by the twenty-first amendment.
The federal interest furthered by the Drinking Age Act supports the
values of temperance and protection of the public welfare. These values
represent the core of the twenty-first amendment. It seems ludicrous to
convolute the amendment simply in the name of tradition. Considering
the Court's willingness to uphold these values, it is likely they will be
willing to break the fifty years of tradition favoring state oriented
solutions to alcohol problems. Thus, by blending the concept of dual
sovereignty with the accommodation principle, the Court can make the
argument that the public welfare is being served in a proper manner,
under the federal Constitution, through enactment of the Drinking Age
Act.
Through recognition of the accommodation principle, the Court seems
willing to shift its focus away from the traditional protective role of the
states and is more apt to consider a "non-traditional" federal approach to
a national problem not easily addressed by individual state actions. In
other words, it will "accommodate" a federal protective interest under the
commerce power where there is potential conflict with states' interests
under the twenty-first amendment. This does not mean that greater
emphasis is being placed on federal approaches to alcohol related prob-
lems. A more credible assessment is that the Court, now more than ever,
will adjudicate in favor of the public health, safety and morals by
accommodating the interest best suited to this end, whether it be state or
federal.
This was the obvious objective of the Supreme Court in California v. La
Rue. 11 The case did not involve a federal interest question, but did use
the accommodation principle in considering the twenty-first amendment
in light of the first and fourteenth amendments. The controversy arose
when liquor license holders and topless dancers challenged the constitu-
tionality of state regulations prohibiting sexually explicit entertainment
in licensed bars and nightclubs. The Court concluded that the states'
interest in protecting the public safety, health and morality 1 2 was
... 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
112 After hearing evidence at public hearings relating to sexually explicit entertainment
in "topless" and "bottomless" bars and nightclubs, which evidence indicated that sexual
contact had taken place between customers and entertainers, and that rape, prostitution,
indecent exposure and assaults on police officers had taken place on or immediately
adjacent to the licensed premises, the California Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control
promulgated regulations prohibiting certain specified acts. Id. at 110-11.
1986]
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1986
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
greater than the dancers' freedom of expression under the first amend-
ment. Consequently, the state law was held to be constitutional even
though a couple of the "specified acts" would have been protected under
the first amendment if they had been at issue outside the context of the
twenty-first amendment. The essence of La Rue is that the Court pursued
a policy of public protection and implicitly upheld the value of temper-
ance, which is inherent in the twenty-first amendment.
Some commentators state that La Rue has been hailed as a return by
the Court to its former position that states have broad and plenary
powers under the twenty-first amendment. 113 To read La Rue in this
manner is to misconstrue the Court's disdain for lewd and obscene acts as
a repudiation of its recent accommodation approach. The Court is willing
to downplay what it considers the "barest minimum of protected expres-
sion"114 in favor of the state's interest in preventing social harms. The
grant of power to the State of California in this opinion springs from the
twenty-first amendment through the filter of the balancing process,11 5
which indicates the Court has not abandoned the accommodation princi-
ple. Also, this opinion can be narrowly read to have no reach beyond the
zone where the first and twenty-first amendments cross paths. 116
The authority of the commerce clause and the continued viability of the
accommodation principle are manifested in California Liquor Dealers
Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum.1 7 The Court invalidated a state statutory
plan for resale price maintenance of wine as violative of the Sherman
Antitrust act. The state's presentation of the twenty-first amendment as
a shield from the reach of the federal statute was not endorsed by the
Court."" The Court was unwaivering in making its argument that the
113 See Note, State Power to Regulate Liquor: Section Two of the Twenty-First Amend-
ment, Reconsidered, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1131, 1142 (1973); Note, The Concept of State
Powers Under the Twenty-First Amendment, 40 TENN. L. REV. 465-66 (1973). See also Note,
The Effect of the Twenty-First Amendment On State Authority to Control Intoxicating
Liquors, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1578, 1606 (1975).
114 New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 716 (1981)(referring to
barroom-type nude dancing)(quoting Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975)).
" La Rue, 409 U.S. at 114-16.
116 It can be argued that La Rue and its progeny can be narrowly read to address only the
issue of liquor control as it is associated with lewd behavior. See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); and New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714
(1981).
117 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
118 The petitioners proffered for consideration, the states' interests in the price schedule
(as stated by the California Supreme Court in Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals
Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 579 P.2d 476 (1978)), which is that orderly market conditions might
"reduce excessive consumption, thereby encouraging temperance" 21 Cal. 3d at 456, 579
P.2d at 493. The Court rejected outright this interest, as weighed against the federal
interest in a competitive economy, because it found no substantiation that a pricing system
has any direct effect on consumption of alcohol. To the contrary, a state study showed
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federal interests in a competitive economy prevailed over the state's
interest in orderly market conditions."19
Justice Powell, when writing this opinion, followed the lead of Justice
Stewart in Idlewild.120 He undertook the same perfunctory task of
placing the earlier decisions in their proper historical perspective' 21 and
then went on to quote the pivitol language of Idlewild.122 Justice Powell
establishes a pragmatic approach to harmonizing federal and state
powers over liquor because he recognized that, historically, there has
been no "bright line" between them. 123 This accommodation analysis
lends itself easily to the proposition of this Note: that the balancing
process is alive and well and will be utilized if and when the Drinking
Age Act's constitutionality is tested in our highest Court.
Further support that a federal interest, as expressed through a
statute, can withstand a challenge based on an amendment to the
Constitution, comes from Midcal. The Court emphasized the relative
importance of the Sherman Act, as it prevailed in this case over the
twenty-first amendment, with the following passage, "[a]lthough the
federal interest is expressed through a statute rather than a constitu-
tional provision, Congress 'exercis[ed] all the power it possessed' under
the Commerce Clause when it approved the Sherman Act."'124 Undoubt-
edly, this judicial recognition gives the Drinking Age Act clout since it,
too, is exercised under the power of the commerce clause. Justice Powell
also gives implicit recognition to the relative strength of the commerce
clause when it is used to validate a federal interest in protecting its
citizens.
As general precedential value, Midcal stands for the proposition that a
competitive economy, essential to the individual consumer's needs and
well-being, is more important than a state's interest in exerting control
over one aspect of the sale of liquor. By way of analogy, the assurance of
safe highways, essential to the health and welfare of individual citizens,
has great potential value as precedent when used as a proposition to
challenge a state's interest in assuring that its eighteen to twenty
year-old residents are free to buy alcoholic beverages.
consumption to have increased 42% during the tenure of the pricing system. Midcal, 445
U.S. at 112-14.
This action by the Court signifies that it will not be sufficient to merely beat the drum of
temperance as the legitimate interest behind a law, without showing some substantial
relationship between the statute and its effect on alcohol consumption.
119 445 U.S. at 110-11.
120 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
121 445 U.S. at 106-08.
122 Id. at 109.
123 Id. at 110.
124 Id. at 111 (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dryers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435
(1932)).
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In summary, Midcal affirms the rationale of accommodation which
began in 1964 with the Idlewild opinion. It serves as a stepping stone in
the development of this process, and as such, provides the conceptual
groundwork the Court [should] utilize as the controversy over control of
intoxicating liquors takes shape in the remaining half of the 1980's. The
Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984 is a controversial law because, once
again, Congress has taken bold initiatives in an area where some would
say it has no power to regulate.
VII. CONCLUSION
The National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984 will surely create
local controversy as the separate states are forced to legislate a uniform
minimum drinking age of twenty-one. The academic and political worlds
offer divergent opinions as to the law's propriety, effectiveness and
fairness to the youth groups affected by the Act. 125 As noted, the
constitutional issues are not well settled. The informal legal opinions
related to the law offer reinforcement for argument both pro and con. The
weight of the legal authority that will likely be relied on seems to favor
the Act's constitutional soundness.
As is always the case in this democracy, the courts will speak and settle
the issue. 126 The Supreme Court of the United States is likely to be the
final arbiter of the controversy. Under the Court's most recent approach
to the tenth amendment in Garcia, the Act will easily clear this hurdle.
The most interesting and novel challenge will arise as the tenth and
twenty-first amendments intersect. The Court in its twenty-first amend-
ment analysis is willing to "accommodate" that legislative interest,
either federal or state, which most effectively addresses the problem a
law seeks to alleviate.
Turning to the interests being asserted, it can be summarized that the
federal interest of the Drinking Age Act is to curb highway deaths of
teenagers who drink and drive. The Act also protects the general
motoring public. On the other hand, the states have a legitimate interest
in asserting their sovereign decision making authority and practicing
"home-rule" in determining what is best for their residents.
The need for a uniform and consistent national drinking age law is
obvious. 127 Because young people have traditionally been the beneficia-
ries of special governmental protection, it appears the federal interest
will prevail. Congress has used a legitimate, reasonable and previously
125 See supra notes 24-46 and accompanying text.
121 See supra note 24.
127 See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
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tested approach 128 to coerce the state sovereign will. This approach now
appears stronger in post-Usery jurisprudence than ever before. On the
strength of the Garcia decision and the "accommodation" of strong federal
interests, the Act will survive any legal challenges it faces.
KEVIN KADLEC
128 During the Sixties the withholding of highway funds was used to compel states to set
their billboard advertising away from the highways, and in the Seventies the same
approach was used to bring about a national uniform speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour.
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